Why was the international community unable to prevent the Rwanda Genocide, and what lessons can be learned from this tragic episode?

This paper will explore the Rwandan Genocide by analysing the action and reaction of the international community. When the Germans first colonized Rwanda in 1894, they believed that the Tutsi ruling class were racially superior to the other native peoples of Rwanda because of their supposed “Hamitic” origins, which made them more “European” (Dayan et al., 2011). Later in 1923, Belgium took over the territory from the Germans and made Rwanda a Belgian colony. During Belgian rule, Tutsis were favoured for all administrative positions, and Hutus were actively discriminated (Nampijja, 2022). Towards the end of the Belgian control, the government began to encourage democracy. As a result, in 1961 the Hutu won by an overwhelming majority in UN-supervised elections. On July 1^st of 1962, the country was granted independence from the Belgians (Amnesty International, 2010).

In 1973, the Hutu ethnic group took political control of the country when Juvenal Habyarimana became president after a military putsch. However, there were contentions to the government and guerrillas emerged as demonstration of opposition. In 1993 the government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front guerrillas, formed by Tutsi rebels, signed a peace agreement. However, one year later, with the assassination of the president, the peace agreement was dismissed, and the genocide was triggered. The killings were driven by the central government in an attempt to eradicate the "Tutsi cockroaches". In response, the Hutu community took over the streets to kill children and adults to eradicate the next generation of Tutsis. After two weeks, the UN peacekeepers who were sent to guarantee peace in the territory were withdrawn on April 21st (France 24, 2019). Despite sending containment troops to Rwanda, “[m]ore than one million people were systematically killed in less than three months. The vast majority were Tutsis, but Hutus and others who opposed the genocide were also killed” (UN, n/d). The international community knew what was occurring, and it abandoned Rwanda. This research report intends to explore the reasons why the international community was unable to prevent the Rwanda Genocide, and what lessons can be learned from this tragic episode.

The first topic to explore relates to the theories and concepts framing the development of the humanitarian action conducted in Rwanda in 1994. Establishing the difference between humanitarian intervention, emergency, and intervention itself is crucial for better understanding. According to Nederveen Pieterse (1997, pp. 72-73), based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, coercive intervention in the affairs of a state is justified in case of threat to international peace and security humanitarian intervention. Therefore, military forces are used with the intention of keeping people alive, and moreover providing basic needs in an emergency (Seybolt, 2010). In this regard, the term emergency is used when referring to catastrophes, conflicts, and settings for human suffering (Calhoun, 2010, p. 19). In contrast, intervention itself is understood as “...the transgression of a sovereign state's exclusive, territorially defined, domain of political authority” (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 1058).

Furthermore, theoretical differences can be interpreting the actions of the international community in Rwanda. Weiss (1999, pp. 2 - 4) highlighted five schools of thought: First, the classists who believe that humanitarian action can and should be completely from politics. Second, the political humanitarians who believe that humanitarian action and politics are impossible to separate. Third, the minimalists who intend to cause no harm when assisting. Fourth, the maximalists who believe humanitarian intervention is part of a bigger part of the solution to the conflict. And fifth, the solidarists who abandon neutrality and choose sides. In the Rwandan case, we can find impartial humanitarianism as well as political humanitarianism given that the International Committee of The Red Cross led the impartial humanitarianism in Rwanda since they provided relief to all victims, yet the UN “humanitarian intervention” was mostly political given that they prioritized their political objectives such as getting all the Europeans out of the country rather than helping the Tutsi community that was being killed. Ultimately, the Rwandan case serves as an example of how the different actors of the international community face a complicity of impartiality, particularly the UN Security Council.

The question then emerges as to the role played by the international community in the failure to prevent the genocides in Rwanda. According to Karawi (2016, p. 6), the UN almost always operates under an inherent concept of neutrality. Likewise, Blue Helmet troops are not authorized to open fire on any individual participating in the conflict, not even for self-defense, unless there is a direct order from the agency's Security Council. It was this excessive neutrality of the UN that allowed the Rwandan genocide to occur, making it a determining factor for the failure of this mission (Perazzo, 2010). It is also important to highlight the role of France in the prolongation of the conflict. According to Bayoud (2021), France maintained close relations with the Rwandan government of President Habyariama, dominated by the Hutu ethnic group, and during this period France provided military and political support to the Hutu government. Not only France turned a blind eye to the genocide, but the West in general. Thus, the lack of interest, neutrality, and ineffectiveness of the peacekeepers demonstrations the limited impact of the Security Council in cases involving humanitarian aid.

In relation to cases of humanitarian aid in similar circumstances, we find NATO’s intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, just two years before the Rwandan Genocide. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia resulted in the partition of the Serbian population, which was unevenly distributed throughout the Yugoslav federation (Karawi, 2016, p. 41). The conflict resulted in a massive wave of violence, ethnic cleansing, with hundreds of thousands of people killed and around one million people displaced (Suarez Jaramillo, 2020). When comparing both cases, two points emerge. First, the conflict in Rwanda originated from the cultural differentiations and stratification they suffered as a colony. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the origin of the conflict was the division of the former Yugoslavia as well as the ethnic-religious divisions. Second, in both cases, there was no effective assistance given by the UN. Rwandans were counting on UNAMIR for their protection, but ultimately, these were insufficient, sheltering under neutrality (Karawi, 2016, p. 51). NATO’s intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and later in Rwanda in 1994 presents a way to analyse how failures of humanitarian intervention can be traced back to previous cases and how we can learn lessons from what happened.

Finally, the genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented and avoided before it was consummated (Zawels, 2001). An example of this is the late deployment of Operation Turquoise by France, which demonstrates the capacity of the international community to intervene militarily when the political will exists. Not only cases such as Rwanda but also Kosovo have shown that the system of collective security envisaged by the UN Charter is in crisis. That is why we can learn three lessons: First, these crises should prompt members of the international community to seek ways to update the principles and mechanisms underpinning global peacekeeping and security actions. Second, as stated by Lange (1998), in times of crisis when relief organizations are stretched beyond capacity, military organizations may be enlisted to leverage their distinct capabilities, or their comparative strengths, until relief organizations can adequately address humanitarian requirements. Third, the international community should focus on the concept of prevention rather than reaction. This requires the ability to identify early warning situations and raise awareness among decision-makers, particularly those from democratic countries. As a result, the question of whether the international community possesses the appropriate procedures to provide humanitarian aid when needed continues to prevail nowadays.

In conclusion, the historical background of Rwanda's colonization, ethnic divisions, and the failure of international actors to intervene effectively played a crucial role in the genocide. The analysis of the Rwandan case allowed us to clarify several key aspects. First, the emphasis on the theoretical differences that framed humanitarian action. Second, the role played by the international community, the lack of effective action by the UN peacekeepers and the prioritization of self-interests of the states that showcased the weaknesses of the humanitarian intervention system. Third, the similarities and differences in the response of the international community to the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwandaexposed the limitations of the UN’s approach to neutrality and the need for a more proactive stance in situations of imminent mass violence. In essence, it can be said that the Rwandan genocide serves as a reminder of the consequences that international inaction can bring and of the urgent need for the world community to improve its mechanisms for preventing and responding to humanitarian crises.

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